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The UK’s social scientists are sometimes
accused of being reluctant to get
involved in public policy-making. If this
was ever true of economists, it is
certainly not now. Many Whitehall
chief economist positions – including at
the Department of Health, the
Department for International
Development and the Inland Revenue –
are now held by academic economists,
as are the top jobs at the Bank of
England, the Competition Commission,
the Office of Fair Trading and Ofcom.
And research institutions like the
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
and the Institute  for Fiscal Studies are
deeply involved  in the design and
evaluation of a range of government
policies, including in education,
taxation and the labour market.
Under its new leadership – John
Van Reenen (director) and Stephen
Machin (research director) – and with
renewed funding from the Economic
and Social Research Council, CEP is re-
emphasising its commitment to seeking
to understand economic performance
and inform government policy through
outstanding scientific research. The
latest output is on show in this issue of
Centrepiece, including summaries of
two major new books – one on
multinational firms, one on education –
plus a revisit to a 1990s classic on
unemployment, by CEP’s founder
director Richard Layard and colleagues.
Shorter articles focus on other topics at
the core of CEP’s continuing research
agenda: inequality, productivity,
technology and the labour market.
CEP is also developing its
communication efforts beyond this
magazine. During the UK General
Election campaign, we launched a
series of Election Analyses. These
background briefings to the debates
looked at the Labour government's
record since 1997 and discussed the
research evidence on some of the key
policy battlegrounds, including
immigration, health, education,
welfare, macroeconomic performance
and labour market policy. This 
policy analysis format will be given 
a more international focus in the
second half of the year, with plans to
inform debate around the time of the
summit meetings of the G-8, the
European Union and the World 
Trade Organisation.
We welcome feedback on this work.
Please feel free to email me with
comments on articles and analyses in
the magazine or on the website, or
requests for more information. And do
pass the magazine and/or CEP’s website
address (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/) onto
colleagues who would find them
interesting and useful – whether
they’re involved in research, policy-
making or both.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@compuserve.com
Centrepiece is the magazine of the 
Centre for Economic Performance at the 
London School of Economics. Articles in this
issue reflect the opinions of the authors, not of
the Centre. Requests for permission to
reproduce the articles should be sent to the
Editor at the address below. 
Editorial and Subscriptions Office
Centre for Economic Performance
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Annual subscriptions for one year (3 issues):
Individuals £13.00
Students £8.00
Organisations (UK and Europe) £30.00
Rest of world £39.00
Visa and Mastercard accepted
Cheques payable to London School of
Economics
© Centre for Economic Performance 2005
Volume 10 Issue 1 
(ISSN 1362-3761) All rights reserved.
Editor, Romesh Vaitilingam
Design, Raphael Whittle
Print, Ghyllprint Ltd
Cover illustration, Kate Prentice
Centrepiece is printed on environmentally
friendly, chlorine-free paper.
Centre Piece
Editorial
CentrePiece Spring 2005
1
page 2  
Multinationals: heroes or villains 
of the global economy?
Tony Venables argues that multinationals are generally a 
force for prosperity in the world economy
page 8 
Is new technology good or 
bad for jobs? 
Chris Pissarides explores the relationship between innovation, 
productivity growth and employment
page 14  
What’s the good of education?
Stephen Machin and Anna Vignoles evaluate the investments in 
education made by individuals, firms and governments
page 18  
Social mobility in Britain:
low and falling
Jo Blanden and colleagues find that social mobility is significantly 
lower than in some other developed countries
page 23
Tackling unemployment: Europe’s 
successes and failures 
Richard Layard and colleagues revisit their landmark analysis 
of macroeconomic performance and the labour market
Contents in brief...
page 11  
Boffins in the USA: the 
boost to UK productivity
John Van Reenen reveals an 
economic ‘special relationship’
page 12  
More inequality means
higher inflation
Chris Crowe analyses the impact of
social conflict on inflation
page 21  
What’s wrong with 
Europe’s economy?
Adair Turner looks at Challenges 
for Europe
page 22  
Pay inequalities and
economic performance
David Marsden examines firms’
performance management systems
page 28  
New opportunities for
Britain’s trade unions?
John Kelly and Paul Willman on 
Union Organisation and Activity
Is new technology
good or bad for jobs? 
page 8 
What’s wrong with 
Europe’s economy?
page 21  
CentrePiece Spring 2005
2
F
oreign-owned
multinationals employ
one worker in every five
in European
manufacturing and one
in seven in US
manufacturing. They sell one euro in every
four of manufactured goods in Europe
and one dollar in five in the United States.
Yet policy-makers and the public
around the world have mixed feelings
about multinationals: they see them either
as welcome bearers of foreign wealth and
knowledge or as unwelcome threats to
national wealth and identity. Policy-makers
want multinationals to invest in their
country, but are unhappy when national
firms close down domestic activities and
open up foreign ones or when foreign
brands compete successfully with 
national ones.
This Jekyll and Hyde perception of
multinationals stems more from
ambiguous feelings about large market
players with no national identity than
from rigorous economic analysis. Indeed,
the debate on multinationals is rarely
grounded on economic arguments and
there is little understanding of what
multinationals are, or of what costs and
benefits they bring to local economies.
Multinationals are often different from
purely national firms and some concerns
are legitimate. They are relatively large
and they do have competitive power in
the market place and bargaining power in
the policy-making arena, particularly in
smaller developing countries. They are
global players that can circumvent local
regulations and policies more easily than
national firms. They are footloose, able to
move activities between their plants at
relatively low cost, removing benefits as
rapidly as they deliver them. And they do
mass-produce standardised products,
jeopardising product variety. 
Yet other features of multinationals
also explain why countries compete
fiercely to attract them. They often bring
scarce technologies, skills and financial
resources. They are fast in taking
advantage of new opportunities and
contributing to national wealth creation.
They are bound by international standards
and market competition and they often
offer better employment conditions and
product qualities than national firms. 
Moreover, multinationals are not just
giant corporations like Microsoft or Coca
Cola. Many small and medium-sized
enterprises, firms with limited market
power in domestic and foreign markets,
have one or more foreign subsidiaries.
Investing abroad and thus becoming a
multinational is a strategy open to many
types of firms.
Our book addresses concerns about
multinationals and brings clarity to the
debate. It provides a thorough
assessment of what multinationals are,
why and where they arise and their
impact on home and host economies. We
conclude that although none of these
concerns have straightforward answers,
the argument favours multinationals:
they are a fundamental feature of
modern economies and there is no
evidence that they are less beneficial 
to home and host economies than
national firms. 
What are multinationals?
Multinationals are firms that own a
significant equity share – typically 50% or
more – of another company operating in
a foreign country. They include modern
corporations like IBM, General Motors,
Intel and Nike, but also small firms like
Calzaturificio Carmens, a shoemaker
employing 0 workers divided between
Padua (Italy) and Vranje (Serbia). 
The activities of multinationals are best
measured by firm-level data like sales or
number of employees. Unfortunately,
these data are not widely available.
Instead, researchers rely on data on flows
Multinational firms are demonised by 
anti-globalisation campaigners. Yet according to
a new book by Tony Venables and colleagues,
the evidence is that they are generally a force
for prosperity in the world economy.
Multinationals:
heroes or villains of the
global economy?
of foreign direct investment (FDI) recorded
from balance of payment statistics and
which are available across time, industrial
sectors and for many receiving and
sending countries.
FDI is an investment in a foreign
company where the foreign investor owns
at least 10% of the ordinary shares,
undertaken with the objective of
establishing a ‘lasting interest’ in the
country, a long-term relationship and
significant influence on the management
of the firm. FDI flows are different from
portfolio investments, which can be
divested easily and do not have significant
influence on the management of the firm.
Thus, to create, acquire or expand a
foreign subsidiary, multinationals
undertake FDI.
The facts on foreign 
direct investment
Fact 1: the recent growth of FDI has
far outpaced the growth of trade and
income
The past 20 years has seen an enormous
growth of activity by multinationals. 
Figure 1 shows that inflows of FDI have
grown much faster than either trade or
income. While worldwide real GDP
increased at a rate of 2.5% a year
between 1985-99 and worldwide exports
by 5.6%, worldwide real inflows of FDI
increased by nearly 18%. This compares
strikingly with pre-1985 data, when 
GDP, exports and FDI were following 
closer trends.
Fact 2: FDI originates predominantly
from advanced countries
Between 1998-2000, 93% of outward FDI
flows originated in an advanced country.
Developing countries increased their share
of outward flows through the 1970s and
1980s to a peak of 15% in the mid-
1990s, only to see it then decline. Among
individual countries, the United States is
the world’s largest foreign investor. The EU
as a whole accounts for 71% of all
outward stocks, a share that has risen
sharply, partly because of the rise in 
intra-EU investments associated with
deepening integration.
In the developing world, only the Asian
countries – especially China, Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan –
supplied a significant share of world FDI
flows by the mid-1990s. Most of these
investments took place within Asia and
therefore declined drastically following the
Asian crisis in 1997/8.
Yet most of the difference between the
advanced and developing countries is
accounted for by sheer economic size, and
the difference in outflows relative to GDP
is perhaps less than might be expected.
Figure 2 shows FDI outflows relative to
source country GDP. In the mid-1990s,
outward flows ranged between an
average of 1.3% of GDP for the advanced
countries to an average of 0.9% for the
developing countries. The noticeable
exception is the EU: although it declined in
2001, the FDI share of GDP remains higher
for the EU than elsewhere in the world. 
Figure 1:
Trends in world GDP, exports and FDI inflows
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Figure 2:
Sources of outward FDI
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Fact 3: FDI goes predominantly to
advanced countries though the 
share of developing countries has
been rising
The advanced countries’ share of world
FDI inflows has fluctuated between 58%
and 78%. This is a lower share than as
sources of FDI but the breakdown is
similar, with the largest share concentrated
in the EU, although the United States is
the largest single destination country. 
The share of worldwide FDI received 
by the developing and transition
economies jumped from % in 1988-93 to
more than 40% in 1992-7 before falling
again to 21%. These flows go
overwhelmingly to Asia and Latin America,
with China alone taking around one
quarter of the total.
The increase in FDI flows to developing
countries reflects their growing
importance as a source of financing in
these economies. Figure 3 shows FDI
inflows relative to the GDP of the host
economy. During 1988-92, advanced
countries received FDI inflows at an
average annual rate of 0.9% of GDP,
while the average for developing and
transition countries was 0.78%. By 1993-
9, the inflow rate for the advanced
countries had increased to 2.3% of GDP,
while that for developing and transition
countries had more than doubled to 3.4%
of GDP, with Asia and Latin America
taking the lion’s share.
Fact 4: mergers and acquisitions
account for the dominant share of
FDI flows 
The establishment of a foreign subsidiary
may take place in two ways: ‘greenfield
investment’, when a new plant is set up
from scratch; or a merger with or
acquisition of an existing firm (M&A).
Table 1 shows that the majority of FDI
takes place through M&A and its share
has increased steadily since the mid-1980s
from 66% to 76%. The share of M&A is
much smaller in developing countries.
Fact 5: most FDI is concentrated in
skill and technology intensive
industries
The most noticeable trend in the sectoral
distribution of FDI stocks in the advanced
countries is the increase in the share of
services and the parallel decline of the
primary sector. This trend reflects the
overall shift of world GDP from the
primary sector and agriculture towards
services. The share of manufacturing in FDI
– approximately 40% – is larger than the
share of manufacturing in world GDP –
approximately 30%.
Table 2 shows the distribution of world
inward FDI stocks: the share of services is
50%, manufacturing 42% and the
primary sector 8%. The broad sectors in
which the presence of multinationals is
greatest are characterised by large
investments in research and development,
a large share of professional and technical
workers and the production of technically
complex or differentiated goods.
Fact 6: multinationals are larger and
typically more productive than
national firms
Multinationals are generally large
companies compared with national firms.
Their home activities are generally larger
than those of national firms, and foreign
subsidiaries are on average larger than
national firms in host economies. A crude
measure of this gap in host countries can
be gauged by comparing the average size
CentrePiece Spring 2005
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Table 1:
Cross-border M&A investments as a percentage of FDI
inflows to the host countries
1987-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2001
World 66.29% 44.75% 60.18% 76.23%
Developed countries 77.49% 64.93% 85.39% 88.96%
Developing countries and 
transition economies 21.94% 15.49% 25.79% 35.74%
Figure 3:
Hosts of inward FDI
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Multinationals generally
perform better than
national firms in home
and host economies alike
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of foreign subsidiaries with that of all
manufacturing firms in the world’s five
biggest economies.
Table 3 shows that foreign subsidiaries
are relatively large when size is measured
by number of employees, turnover or
value added. It also shows that the labour
productivity of foreign subsidiaries is above
average, both when measured by turnover
and value added per employee. This
finding is partly due to the sectoral
composition of FDI, which is different from
that of the economy as a whole.
The evidence on the
operations and impact of
multinationals
Mobility of firms not capital
FDI is long-term compared with highly
mobile capital flows like portfolio
investments or bank credits. Such
investments cover the cost of starting or
buying and then running foreign plants or
other activities, and are best thought of as
movements of firms rather than
movements of capital.
The key difference is that firms bring in
their own very distinctive bundle of
capabilities. Whether a loan is granted by
Citicorp or Credit Agricole does not make
much of a difference. But whether FDI is
carried out by Renault or Monsanto makes
a great deal of difference. Indeed, each
firm is a unique bundle of factors,
competences and procedures that get
transferred to foreign operations.
Consequently, different investments might
have substantially different effects on the
host and home economies. 
Variety of motives
The heterogeneity in the characteristics of
multinationals is mirrored in the variety of
reasons why firms become multinationals.
Much FDI is ‘horizontal’, intended
primarily to serve host country markets. 
In some cases, these investments arise to
circumvent trade barriers and are boosted
by protectionism. In others, they are
promoted by trade liberalisation, as when
Table 2:
World inward FDI stock by industry 
Industry Share of world FDI inward stock (%)
Total 100
Manufacturing 41.6
Food, beverages and tobacco 2.8
Textiles, clothing and leather 1.0
Wood and wood products 1.5
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.0
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1.9
Chemicals and chemical products 6.7
Rubber and plastic products 0.6
Non-metallic mineral products 1.0
Metal and metal products 3.0
Machinery and equipment 2.5
Electronic and electronic equipment 3.6
Precision instruments 1.4
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 3.0
Other manufacturing 11.6
Services 50.3
Trade 10.5
Transport, storage and communications 5.9
Finance 15.9
Business activities 10.4
Other services 7.6
Primary sector 8.1
Table 3:
Comparing the average size and labour productivity 
of foreign affiliates and all firms in manufacturing in the 
five biggest national economies
Year: 1997 France Germany Japan UK United States
Foreign All firms Foreign All firms Foreign All firms Foreign All firms Foreign All firms
affiliates affiliates affiliates affiliates affiliates
Number of employees 
per firm 265.6 130.9 288.9 172.5 313.8 49.1 301.9 25.4 782.5 52.9
Turnover per firm 
($ millions) 61.1 25.8 105.6 33.8 184.1 11.5 94.5 4.5 234.6 10.7
Value added per firm 
($ millions) 18.0 7.7 _ 6.0 34.6 3.4 32.2 1.9 66.2 3.8
Turnover per employee 
($ millions) 0.23 0.197 0.366 0.196 0.587 0.234 0.313 0.177 0.3 0.202
Value added ($ millions)/
employees 0.068 0.059 _ 0.035 0.110 0.068 0.107 0.073 0.085 0.072
Being multinational is
often the best way to
operate in an integrated
global economy
regional economic integration provides a
boost to inward FDI. 
The standard explanation of why firms
invest abroad is rooted in ‘scale
economies’. Some firms develop intangible
assets like a brand name or new
technology, the benefits of which can be
spread across several plants: the brand
name of Coca Cola benefits Coca Cola
plants in the United States as well as in
Ghana. These intangible assets are a
source of increasing returns to scale and
market power. That is why multinationals
are often giant corporations.
So why is a medium-sized firm like
Calzaturificio Carmens a multinational?
Because firms also invest abroad for
reasons other than the exploitation of
market power and by so doing are able to
save on production and distribution costs.
They go abroad to gain market access, to
look for cheap factors of production, to
source specific technologies and to 
exploit location-specific externalities. 
These motives can be pursued by 
relatively small firms that implement
flexible and fragmented operations across
several countries. Increasingly, firms are
organising their production to benefit
from the advantages that freer trade and
lower transport costs have created. 
Internal or external operations
Foreign operations do not necessarily need
to be carried out by wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries. In many circumstances, they
can be carried out in looser ways, through
arms’ length agreements with local firms,
such as licensing contracts to produce a
component or assemble a finished good
or agency contracts to market a given
product. These agreements are often
cheaper than setting up a foreign
subsidiary.
A considerable share of international
activities happens this way, and the share
would be even larger but for market
failures that often prevent such
agreements from functioning efficiently.
For example, a multinational with an
exclusive technology may fear that a
licensing contract could lead to dissipation
of its proprietary knowledge. In that case,
setting up a foreign subsidiary is a
preferable strategy. 
Efficiency gains for the 
global economy
Organising activities across the border
works. There are complementarities
between the capabilities of firms and the
characteristics of countries that can be
effectively achieved by FDI as well as by
trade in goods. Multinationals generally
perform better than national firms in
home and host economies alike. Such
firms are able to expand by becoming
multinational, applying their higher
productivity to a wider range of inputs.
Multinationals are also on average
larger than other firms, they do more
research and development and they use
more skilled personnel. There is consistent
and robust evidence of this when
comparing the activities of multinationals
in both home and host countries with
those of national firms. 
Global benefits mostly translate into
local benefits
If multinationals are more efficient than
national firms, then the larger their share of
world activity, the more efficient will be
world production and the higher world
income. But these global benefits may not
necessarily make everyone better off. At the
country level, world efficiency gains might
not always trickle down to improve welfare.
For example, outward FDI diverts
national resources to foreign countries and
this diversion could impoverish home
countries if it leads to a contraction of
activities at home. But the evidence is that
outward FDI strengthens firms, leading to
expansion rather than contraction of
activities at home. The relocation of labour
intensive activities is a key concern in 
high-income countries. But in general, this
is an opportunity for firms to reduce their
production costs and remain competitive.
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Multinationals tend to be
larger than other firms, do
more R&D and use more
skilled personnel
Outward FDI 
strengthens firms,
leading them to expand
rather than contract 
their home activities
Although some activities get transferred,
they become an element of a 
strategic process that strengthens 
activities that remain in the home country.
There is evidence of technological
upgrading as home activities become
more skill intensive and productivity
growth accelerates.
Inward FDI creates employment in the
host country, although there are also
concerns that it causes profits to be
channelled abroad and local industry to be
damaged. But the evidence is generally
that ‘crowding out’ affects only the most
inefficient local producers, local resources
that are released are put to a better use
and prices decline to the benefit of local
consumers. Multinationals generally pay
higher wages than local firms and in some
countries, the impact of job creation by
multinationals has been so large that
wages have risen rapidly, this being most
obvious in the case of Ireland.
There is also considerable evidence that
inward investment is associated with
linkages to local firms and with
technology transfer, raising the
productivity of local firms. These effects
are strongest where host countries have
sufficient skills and technology to interact
with multinationals. But when
technological and income gaps are too
wide, this transfer is limited and FDI is no
shortcut to faster income growth. 
Convergence or divergence of 
world income?
The nature of the interaction between
foreign firms and domestic activities in
host countries has long-term implications
for the convergence of world income. FDI
in developing countries is of particular
importance here. Such investments
provide an important source of capital
formation even in very backward
economies, and more importantly, a
source of firm-level capabilities that would
otherwise be absent.
But the impact on host economies is
small if there is little interaction with
domestic activities. Consider the creation
of human capital, a key ingredient for
growth. The evidence is that even in
developing countries, multinationals
employ more educated personnel than
national firms. If there is no effort to
expand and enhance local skills through
education policies, the gains are likely to
be small.
Ireland is the shining counter-example
here: the high-tech US multinationals that
invested there in the 1980s and 1990s
generated a massive demand for local
skills. Irish engineers based abroad moved
back home and an explicit policy to
enhance high education in science and
technology was launched. This was, 
of course, to the benefit of the whole 
Irish economy. 
Are the positive effects of FDI short
or long lasting?
Another problem for long-term income
growth is that the presence of
multinationals could be short-lived. The
cost to multinationals of relocating
activity is generally low as production is
already organised across countries. But
while the only available evidence on the
volatility of multinationals is for high-
income economies, surprisingly it 
shows that they are less volatile than
national firms. Multinationals react 
faster to shocks but the overall
magnitude of their reaction is less than
that of national firms.
This need not be the case for
developing countries. Many recent FDI
flows to developing countries are
essentially seeking cheap labour and
many are concentrated in cheap labour
countries neighbouring large high-income
markets, like Mexico or the Central and
Eastern European countries. And thanks
to FDI, these economies have been able
to achieve high rates of growth.
But wages rise with income. For these
foreign activities to stay in the longer
term, other attractions must be
developed. Many of these favourite
locations of the 1990s are already falling
out of favour as activities move to new
locations where labour is cheaper.
Particularly worrying are reports that 
even countries with an obvious 
locational advantage like Mexico are
seeing FDI moving to locations further
away from the United States but where
labour is cheaper.
Foreign firms may go as they come
and their positive effects could be short-
lived. For this reason, developing
countries cannot just rely on cheap
labour to attract FDI. The strategy
successfully followed by Ireland managed
to use its initial cost advantage to create
substantial clusters of foreign firms
drawing on a highly skilled labour force.
CentrePiece Spring 2005
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Multinational Firms in the World Economy
by Giorgio Barba Navaretti and 
Anthony J Venables (with Frank G Barry,
Karolina Ekholm, Anna M Falzoni,
Jan I Haaland, Karen Helene Midelfart and
Alessandro Turrini) is published by 
Princeton University Press (2005).
Giorgio Barba Navaretti is Professor of
International Economics at the University 
of Milan. Anthony J Venables is 
Professor of International Economics at 
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on globalisation.
Even in developing
countries, multinationals
employ more educated
personnel than 
national firms
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G
overnments
throughout the 
world strive for
technological
progress. Economists
agree that differences
in technological attainment are the main
cause of differences in incomes and
wealth across the world. So is it not odd
that we should even be raising the
question of how good new technology is
for jobs? If it is not good for jobs, what is
it good for? How can new technology
achieve so many good things if it is bad
for jobs?
But odd as it may seem, the question
is being asked whenever there is talk of
new technology. Adverse comment takes
different forms. Sometimes it is in
connection with the romanticised
machine-breaking of the Luddites of early
nineteenth century Britain, the skilled
workers who lost their jobs to machines.
More frequently, it is in connection with a
more boring comparison of statistics
across nations.
In the 1990s, new technology was
making American labour more productive,
employment was rising and
unemployment was falling to levels that
seemed to defy analysis. Europe’s
productivity gains were smaller but its
labour market performance was even
worse. Talk of Europe’s ‘jobless recovery’
became the vogue (though currently, it is
the United States that is going through a
jobless recovery, as explained by Richard
Freeman and William Rodgers in the last
issue of Centrepiece).
Why might new technology be bad for
jobs, despite its many other good things,
and what is in the numbers? Recent work
I have done at the CEP in collaboration
with Giovanna Vallanti and Sandra Bulli
sheds light on this question.
Ironically, it is sometimes easier for the
layperson to come up with reasons why
new technology may be bad for jobs than
it is for the trained economist. The
layperson will almost certainly think of the
Luddites’ plight or the loss of
manufacturing employment. If new
technology invents machines that can do
the job that workers are doing, then, the
argument goes, it must be bad for jobs.
But the economist will point to the
fact that new technology makes jobs more
productive. More productivity means more
wealth and more wealthy individuals
spend more. So new jobs are needed to
satisfy their new needs. As John F
Kennedy put it, ‘if men have the talent to
invent new machines that put men out of
work, they have the talent to put those
men back to work.’ The key is that 
those men need to get back to work to
produce the extra goods that a wealthier
society requires.
Of course, new technology is not
always of the kind that puts men out of
work. I am writing this article on a
machine that weighs three kilos. It cost 
my employer less than a week of my
wages and does an incredible number of
things, much more than I could ever do
with my hands and my secretary’s
typewriter before this machine was
invented. Yet neither my secretary nor I
lost our jobs. We both learned how to
work with the new technology and this
has made us more productive.
True, some workers do lose their jobs
Is new technology
good or bad for jobs?
The labour market of modern societies 
is in a continuous state of flux and one 
key reason is new technology
‘If men have the talent to invent new 
machines that put men out of work, they have
the talent to put those men back to work.’ 
Chris Pissarides investigates whether
President Kennedy’s claim is still true.
when new technology is invented. Not as
many workers now stand along an
assembly line as in 1936, when Charlie
Chaplin immortalised it in Modern Times.
But then not as many workers sat behind
desks in 1936 as in 1987, when Tom
Wolfe wrote The Bonfire of the Vanities.
The internet has made many airline 
ticket sellers in high streets redundant, 
but it has opened up demand for
programmers, despatch workers and
online payment administrators.
New technology replaces the 
old with the new; it brings change to the
labour market. Some jobs become 
more productive, some jobs become
obsolete and some new types of jobs are
born. The labour market of modern
societies is in a continuous state of flux
and one key reason is new technology.
New fashions, demographics and natural
phenomena also contribute to change. 
But the main reason for the big changes in
the labour market – the decline of
agricultural employment, the rise and then
decline of heavy industrial employment,
the rise of the office worker – is
technological change.
This change is good for jobs overall
because it makes the average job more
productive. But the question of
employment remains: is it also good for
the volume of employment or is a society
undergoing faster technological change
than another necessarily operating at a
lower level of employment than another?
The answer to that question is in the
numbers. Our theoretical work notes that
there are different kinds of technology and
some are good for jobs and some bad. If a
large fraction of technology is of the kind
that makes jobs obsolete, the workers
who lose their jobs will need to be re-
employed elsewhere. Although demand
for new jobs will increase in response to
the rising wealth accompanying the new
technology, job creation and the matching
of the displaced workers with the new
jobs takes time.
An economy undergoing fast
technological change needs to be
continually reallocating workers from the
industries that introduce labour-saving
technology to new industries, and the
result is likely to be higher transitional
unemployment. But if technology is
primarily of the kind that increases the
productivity of workers at their place of
employment, like the introduction of
computers in offices, people are more
likely to hold on to their jobs and
employment will on average be higher.
Our work uses statistical information
from the United States, Japan and most
countries in the European Union to
identify the kinds of technology that have
hit labour markets in the last 30 years. We
find surprising results. Virtually all
technology is of the kind that is good
both for productivity and jobs. We find 
no evidence of massive job destruction at
the level of the economy as a whole 
as a result of the introduction of 
new technology.
Even if some sectors of the economy
are adversely affected by new technology,
these adverse effects do not have an
impact on the aggregate economy. In the
last 30 years, both aggregate productivity
and aggregate employment benefited
greatly from the introduction of new
technology. Modern-day Luddites
undoubtedly get hurt because they lose
their jobs, but JFK got it essentially right:
most jobs benefit from new technology
and the few that do not are replaced by
others with no negative impact on the
volume of overall employment.
Let me give some examples of the
importance of new technology for jobs. In
the United States in the decade before
1973, ‘total factor productivity’ or TFP –
the measure of how efficiently inputs of
capital and labour are used – was growing
at about 1.9% a year. In the 20 years that
followed, TFP growth dropped to an
annual average rate of 0.8%. We estimate
that this drop was responsible for virtually
the entire rise in unemployment from
about 5% to 6.8% of the labour force.
In a similar vein, in Europe,
productivity growth dropped from nearly
4% to 1.8% a year while unemployment
went up from 2.3% to 6.6% of the labour
force. Our estimates show that just over
three percentage points of this 4.3
percentage points rise were due to the
productivity slowdown. This pattern is
repeated throughout the last 30 years.
Figure 1 shows three series for
unemployment in the United States: actual
unemployment; the unemployment trend;
and the series that would be generated if
CentrePiece Spring 2005
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Figure 1:
Unemployment rates in the United States 1968-95
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Virtually all technology
that has hit labour
markets in the last 30
years is of the kind that
is good both for
productivity and jobs
productivity growth were the only
influence on unemployment. It is clear
that our simulated series tracks the trend
changes in unemployment quite well. It
misses out the short-term fluctuations that
are due to the business cycle and
government policy, which is not surprising.
But the influence of new technology on
jobs seems to be sufficiently strong to
track virtually all the underlying trends 
in unemployment.
This close correlation is not repeated in
Europe, but new technology still matters
and is still good for jobs. Figure 2 shows
the unemployment rate in Europe versus
our productivity-predicted rate. A lot more
seems to be influencing the underlying
trends in unemployment than new
technology. The economics literature has
explored the role of labour market policies
and institutional rigidities and much has
been written about them in Centrepiece
(see page 23 of this issue) and elsewhere.
Productivity growth is still an
important influence on jobs, but in Europe
we have to face the fact that a recovery of
productivity growth alone will not be able
to create enough new employment to
offset the rise in unemployment of the
previous two decades. Institutional reform
is also necessary.
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Figure 2:
Unemployment rates in the European Union 1965-98
Christopher Pissarides is Professor of
Economics at the London School of Economics
and director of CEP’s research programme on
macroeconomics. More details on the research
discussed here are in ‘Productivity Growth and
Employment: Theory and Panel Estimates’, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 663, by Christopher A
Pissarides and Giovanna Vallanti
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0663.pdf).
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On its own, a recovery of
productivity growth in
Europe will not create
enough new employment
to offset the rise in
unemployment
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Boffins in the USA:
the boost to UK productivity
The US innovation boom since 1990
has had major benefits for the UK economy. According to
new research by CEP’s director John Van Reenen and
colleagues, without the growth in US spending on
research and development (R&D) in the 1990s, UK
productivity would have been about 5% lower in 2000. 
R&D is important for innovation and productivity, not just
for pushing forward the technological frontier in itself but
also making it possible for firms to learn about and
absorb innovations from elsewhere, including the output
of basic science. Foreign direct investment can play a
significant role in this ‘technology transfer’, and so can
‘outsourcing’ R&D to overseas locations.
This research indicates that the ‘special relationship’
between the UK and the United States exists not only in
politics but also in economics. UK firms that have placed
a large number of their researchers in the United States
have been able to tap into the new ideas of US scientists.
Bringing these ideas from places like Silicon Valley back
to the UK helps boost our productivity. 
The study analyses the accounts of large R&D performing
firms (188 in the UK and 570 in the United States)
between 1990 and 2000 to test the ‘technology
sourcing’ hypothesis. This is the idea that foreign research
labs located on US soil tap into US R&D ‘spillovers’
and improve home country
productivity. The results show
that UK firms that had
established a high proportion of US-based inventors by
1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of
the US R&D stock over the next ten years. What’s more,
the benefits of such technology sourcing were larger in
industries where the productivity gap with the United
States was greater.
The report also looks at US firms investing in R&D labs in
the UK. Unfortunately for the Americans, the benefits of
UK research have not been so large. Just as with
particular industries, it turns out that technology sourcing
is more important for countries that have ‘most to learn’.
So when it comes to the special relationship, the UK
benefits much more from US R&D than vice versa. 
A key question for both research and policy is what is the
ideal place for UK and European companies to locate
their R&D – near universities, near their production
facilities, at home, overseas? Many European policy-
makers fearing ‘delocalisation’ are trying to get firms to
relocate their R&D labs back to Europe in order to reach
the ‘Lisbon agenda’ target of getting R&D up to 3% of
GDP. But the evidence on the productivity benefits
of US-based R&D suggests that they could be
shooting themselves in the foot.
This article summarises ‘How Special is the
Special Relationship? Using the Impact of US
R&D Spillovers on UK Firms as a 
Test of Technology Sourcing’ by Rachel
Griffith, Rupert Harrison and John Van
Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper No. 659
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0659.pdf). Rachel Griffith and Rupert
Harrison are at the Institute for Fiscal
Studies and University College London.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
The productivity benefits of US-based
R&D suggests that policy-makers
should not subsidise firms into
relocating their labs back to Europe
Bringing ideas 
back from places 
like Silicon Valley 
helps to boost 
UK productivity
in brief...
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More inequality means 
higher inflation
All governments claim to want low
inflation – but not all achieve it. While poorer countries
generally fare worse, inflation rates can differ markedly
even between equally wealthy countries. Turkey and 
Korea had similar levels of per capita income at the start
of the 1980s. But while Turkey’s inflation ran at an
average of 60% a year over the next two decades, 
Korea’s was only 6%.
One explanation is that policy-makers in countries like
Turkey were simply unlucky or incompetent. But new
evidence on the relationship between inequality and
inflation uncovered by CEP researcher Chris Crowe
suggests an alternative explanation.
Figure 1 illustrates the inequality-inflation relationship for
53 countries between 1981 and 2000. The vertical 
axis plots the average ‘inflation tax rate’ (a transformation
of the inflation rate that prevents extremely high 
values dominating the data). The horizontal axis plots the
most widely used measure of income inequality, the 
‘Gini coefficient’. More inequality is associated with 
higher inflation.
What explains this link? Crowe argues that politicians in
high-inequality countries might face incentives to choose
higher inflation. His story has two stages. The first shows
why more wealthy groups might actually prefer higher
inflation. The second shows how greater inequality can
make their preferences more salient.
To demonstrate the first stage, note that inflation is a tax.
Printing money raises revenue for the government, in the
process expropriating a proportion of any wealth held in
nominal assets such as cash. But not all people face the
same inflation tax rate. Inflation is regressive, a tax that
hits the poor and middle class hardest because they hold
more nominal assets, as a fraction of total income, than
the wealthy. This means that the wealthy – who can
mostly avoid the inflation tax – might well prefer it to
more progressive taxes such as income tax.
To demonstrate the second stage, note that where
democratic institutions are less effective, some 
groups will carry more weight than others. To put it
simply, money talks. But if political voice depends on
income, then greater inequality means greater inequality
in political participation. In turn, this increases the
adoption of policies – such as inflation – more favourable
to the wealthy.
Analysis of the data shows that the positive relationship
between inequality and inflation holds even when
controlling for other factors like the overall level of
development. On average, countries with the highest
levels of inequality will face inflation at least 40% higher
than countries with the lowest inequality. There is also
evidence that inflation is higher in countries with less
participative political systems.
Of course, this story provides only one explanation for
inflation. Some policy-makers are simply incompetent.
And inflation worldwide has shown clear common trends
– higher in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s –
while inequality has not. But this research offers an
explanation for the positive cross-sectional relationship
between inequality and inflation. More generally, it shows
how the distribution of income and wealth can affect
policy performance.
Politicians in high-
inequality countries 
might face incentives to
choose higher inflation
in brief...
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This article summarises ‘Inflation, Inequality and
Social Conflict’ by Christopher Crowe, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 657
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0657.pdf).
Chris Crowe is a research assistant in CEP’s
globalisation programme. In the autumn, he joins
the International Monetary Fund.
Greater inequality means 
greater inequality in political
participation – and policies more
favourable to the wealthy
Figure 1:
The inequality-inflation relationship
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T
housands of books have
been written on the
subject of education.
Most try to suggest
how we can have both
more and better quality
education. It is taken as read that this
should be the goal of any sensible society.
Yet is there really sufficient evidence to
support the common held belief that we
as individuals, and as a community, should
be investing more in education?
To answer this crucially important
question, we need to turn to an exciting
and rapidly advancing field of research.
The economics of education is about how
education is produced, who gets more (or
less) education and the economic impact
of education on individuals, firms and
society as a whole.
It is therefore concerned with a 
diverse range of issues and provides an
analytical framework to think about such
questions as: What is the best way to raise
pupil achievement? What should we be
paying our teachers? Why has society
become more unequal? And how many
graduates does our society really need? 
Human capital theory
The economics of education has a long
and distinguished history. Adam Smith
alludes to the idea that people might
invest in education to increase the
productive capacity of society. But it is
Gary Becker who is generally considered
the founding father of the field,
developing an analytical framework to
explain why individuals invest in education
and training in a manner analogous to
investment in physical capital. The
resulting human capital theory is still the
basis of most research in the field today.
Human capital theory represented a
distinct break from the past in that
previously education was largely
considered to be a consumption good.
The wealthy were assumed to consume
more non-compulsory education than the
less well off, just as they consumed more
of other goods. Education was also
classified as a status good, consumed by
the middle and upper classes to signal
higher social standing.
Human capital theory suggests that in
fact education should be seen primarily as
an investment good. Individuals invest in
human capital such as schooling because
it makes them more productive and this is
reflected in higher wages. Thus, it is
argued that individuals primarily make
investments in schooling and other forms
of human capital to earn a return, that is,
to increase their income in the future.
What’s the good  
of education?
What is the economic value of investments in
education made by individuals, firms and
governments? A new book edited by Stephen
Machin and Anna Vignoles provides top
quality empirical evidence on the diverse set of
issues that this question raises – about school
effectiveness, higher education funding,
vocational study and much more.
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This essentially simple theory is a
powerful tool for analysing a diverse range
of phenomena. First, there are numerous
forms of human capital, ranging from
formal education through to on the job
learning or firm-provided training. So
human capital theory can be used to
explain investments in schooling, the
provision of training by firms, the
acquisition of vocational qualifications, the
benefits of informal on the job learning
and so on.
But human capital theory also provides
a framework for analysing policy
interventions that result in investments in
education. When the government invests
in programmes such as a youth training
scheme or a smaller class size initiative, we
can analyse the likely impact of these
programmes and their expected social and
private rates of return using human capital
theory. That is the focus of much of our
book, exploring the latest research
evidence on what raises performance at
different stages of the education process –
from compulsory education through
higher education to the role education
plays when children reach adulthood and
enter the labour market.
Compulsory schooling
In the area of compulsory schooling, there
are two key questions. The first is whether
schools really matter for pupil attainment,
a subject addressed in a now voluminous
literature on school effectiveness. The
answer is that schools do matter in that a
significant proportion of the variance of
pupil attainment can be accounted for by
school and teacher effects. But even here,
the story is not so simple. Parental
influences are very important determinants
of pupil attainment, although the best
work in this area still finds a significant
contribution from school attended over
and above other factors.
Given that the school you attend
matters, the second question is how can
education policy be best designed to
enhance student performance? The
answer depends on a number of issues.
First, as theoretical analysis of the delivery
of public services makes clear, it is vital to
understand the objectives of decision-
makers in schools. Schools are not like
private sector firms where the dominant
view of economists is that the objective is
to maximise profits and where there are
clearly defined relationships between
interested groups. Rather, in the case of
schools, there are multiple interest groups,
often with conflicting objectives.
Of course, there are also multiple
outputs from the education system,
ranging from improving test scores to
engendering a love of learning. So the
critical issue for policy is to work out the
best means by which competition,
incentives and accountability can be
brought together to enhance educational
outcomes in the broadest sense.
This leads straight to the second point,
namely that evidence (mainly from the
United States – see Hoxby, 2003) shows
that increased competition among schools
and moves to decentralise school finance
may enhance attainment, but can also
raise inequality because richer parents are
better able to take advantage. This has a
productivity cost in that more able pupils
from poor backgrounds fall behind.
This is particularly important in the UK
context where there is a ‘tail’ of poor
achievers. But despite moves to set up
‘quasi-markets’ in schooling, the
government has also been introducing
initiatives to raise attainment at the
bottom end of the education distribution,
and these seem to be working in the
desired direction.
School resources
From a practical policy perspective,
research on school resources and their
potential impact on pupil attainment is an
important area. Distinguishing between
what works and what does not work is
difficult, and the lines are somewhat hazy
since it is hard to compare the efficacy of
different policies. It is more feasible to
state what does seem to raise pupil
attainment.
The literature on school resources is
controversial, especially research on the
effects of reductions in class sizes. The vast
bulk of studies on class size find little (and
sometimes counter-intuitive) effects of
class size reductions on performance. But
this can be misleading. The best, although
rather context specific, studies, which
adopt a more rigorous experimental
approach to evaluating the impact of class
size reductions, do find important effects
on pupil attainment. Nonetheless, such
reductions only offer a ‘one-off change’,
the effects do not persist and the changes
that do seem to affect attainment involve
relatively large decreases in class size and
are therefore costly. Moreover, some
studies using similar methods do not reach
the same conclusions.
Anecdotally, there are many
statements that teachers, and the way
that teaching is organised, matter for
pupil attainment. While there is some UK
evidence on this, the US evidence showing
important links between year and grade-
specific variations in test score gains and
teacher characteristics does establish that
some teachers achieve consistently better
achievement scores from the children they
teach than do others.
There are currently severe problems in
attracting high ability, highly qualified
students into teaching. One important
policy angle seems to be to try and re-
establish teaching as an important and
well-respected profession. This requires
policy-makers to think seriously about
improving the total compensation package
for teachers, including their pay relative to
other professions, as well as non-
pecuniary conditions of work.
As to the content of teaching, there is
little quantitative evaluation in the UK
setting. But Stephen Machin and Sandra
McNally’s (2004) work on the literacy hour
shows that improving the way in which
teaching is delivered – in this case through
the well-structured literacy hour – can
provide a cost effective means of raising
pupil attainment.
Of course, knowing what works in
education is not sufficient to inform policy.
We need to know at what cost it works
relative to alternative policy options. Yet
there remains a deficiency of good cost-
benefit evaluations in education. Perhaps
the best example of a properly designed
Knowing what works 
in education is not
sufficient to inform
policy – we need to
know at what cost
relative to alternative
policy options
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evaluation in the UK is one of the
Educational Maintenance Allowance
(EMA) – a scheme that essentially involves
‘paying children to stay on at school’ – but
even this does not include a full cost-
benefit analysis (Dearden et al, 2005).
Simple comparisons of the magnitude
of intervention effects (ignoring costs) are
more common. For example, Eric Hanushek
and Steven Rivkin (2003) conclude that
greater school competition increases
teacher quality or, more specifically, reduces
the variance in teacher quality. They then
attempt a direct comparison of this school
competition effect with the class size
effects arising from the now infamous
Tennessee experiment. They suggest that a
reduction in class size has an effect on pupil
attainment that is in the order of one
quarter to one fifth as large as a
comparable increase in the impact of
greater school competition and higher
teacher quality.
While it is disputable whether these
findings can be generalised, what is clear
is the importance of at least being able to
compare the magnitude of any
intervention effects. Only when this is
done to a much greater extent in the
economics of education will researchers be
able to give stronger advice to policy-
makers as to where they should be
spending the marginal dollar or pound of
taxpayers’ money.
Post-compulsory education
The size of the post-compulsory sector of
education has changed dramatically in
many countries in recent years. So has the
socio-economic mix of students. Contrary
to what many expected before the
expansion of higher education, the
expansion has actually increased
educational inequalities so that a greater
share of participants are from well off
backgrounds. As the article on UK social
mobility on page 18 of this issue of
Centrepiece indicates, this has had longer-
term intergenerational consequences.
The fact that simply expanding the UK
higher education system in the 1980s and
1990s did not narrow the socio-economic
gap should be born in mind when
considering future expansion of the system,
especially in the light of government targets
aimed at getting 50% of all young people
to attend university by 2010.
Going beyond the issue of socio-
economic inequality, there are two main
questions about the expansion of higher
education. The first is whether more
graduates are needed and whether, in the
face of an increased supply of graduates,
investment in post-secondary degree
acquisition still yields a significant return.
Here, there is strong evidence that the
demand for graduates still outstrips the
supply and there is still a significant payoff
to having higher education qualifications.
Funding universities
In the face of continually rising student
numbers, the second question is where do
we find the resources to fund universities?
The issue of charging student fees to
attend UK universities is an important
policy question since many people think
students should pay (especially if they are
to earn a future payoff), while others
believe university should be a free good.
On this issue, the empirical evidence is
much weaker, partly because UK tuition
fees were introduced in a way that has
prevented evaluation of their impact on
student participation.
From an economic perspective, the
empirical evidence of persistent high
private returns to a post-secondary degree
would appear to provide justification for
greater student contributions in the form
of higher fees. But the critical point
returns to the issue of the socio-economic
mix of students. If fees are charged (the
structure of which may in the future go
more like the United States with
differential fees by subject and/or
university), then it is absolutely vital that
this does not act to reinforce inequality.
We know that the demand for
education is generally quite inelastic:
increasing the price will not depress
demand substantially. But to the extent
that demand from poorer students is more
elastic, fees will provide yet another barrier
preventing wider access to higher
education. Providing financial support for
able students from poor backgrounds has
to be built in, even if it is costly. The 2003
proposals, which include exemption for
poorer students and an income contingent
loan system to cover fees, go some way
towards this.
Research also indicates that socio-
economic inequalities in education emerge
well before entry to higher education.
Therefore, policy focus needs to be
directed towards reducing inequalities in
the compulsory schooling phase.
Vocational education
The other aspect of post-compulsory
education that is highly policy relevant is
the issue of academic versus vocational
qualifications. The ‘problem’ of vocational
education appears to be a recurring theme
the world over. Many countries, like the
UK, are concerned with the evident lack of
parity between vocational and academic
education, as measured by the lower
economic returns to vocational
qualifications.
This is to miss the point. A major
reason that employers hold vocational
qualifications in lower regard is because less
able students choose to go down the
vocational route. Education acts at least
partially as a screening device, and there is
UK evidence that opting to take the
vocational route generally signals less
cognitive ability.
But there are additional problems
within the vocational education system
itself, at least in the UK. The proliferation of
vocational qualifications has led to a system
little understood by employers. If employers
are not even sure what a person has
learned as a result of taking a particular
vocational qualification, it is unsurprising
that some qualifications have very little
economic value. Continuing to develop
new vocational qualifications in the fruitless
struggle for parity with academic
qualifications may actually exacerbate the
problem (see McIntosh, 2004).
New education policies
need to be drawn up in 
a way that allows robust
quantitative evaluation
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Education and the 
labour market
How well does the education system meet
the needs of the labour market? What is
evident is that employer demand for
graduates is not letting up. Despite rapid
increases in the supply of graduates,
facilitated by the expansion of higher
education, wage differentials between
graduates and non-graduates have not
fallen over time. This implies that the
demand for skills continues to rise. The
other side of this is that, in rapidly
evolving modern workplaces, there are
fewer places for those without educational
qualifications. 
This is one of the key policy issues of
our time. It is compounded in some
countries (notably the UK and the United
States) where the education and skill
distribution has a significant proportion (as
many as one in five) of adults with basic
skills problems. Add to this the fact that
lifelong learning has very little directly
measurable labour market value in the UK
and it would appear that ‘getting it right’
in the compulsory schooling phase is
critically important.
We also know that less able UK
students who go down the vocational
route at age 16 often end up with
qualifications that do not benefit them in
the labour market. While improving the
content and marketability of these
qualifications is one strategy, the
underlying message for policy-makers is
that as many as possible of our 16 year
olds should have attained good basic skills
and the cognitive ability to pursue a high
value qualification. If we continue to let
students leave the education system with
very poor basic skills, these individuals will
be disadvantaged for life. Going back and
trying to repair the damage in mid-career
is unlikely to help them.
Evaluating education policies
So how do we assess the economics of
education field in terms of its usefulness
for policy-making? While by no means
perfect, the evaluation of the EMA
scheme provides a standard in terms of
robust and policy applicable analysis. There
are two reasons why it was so effective.
The first is that in this particular policy
area, economists already had the
necessary tools with which to undertake
the analysis. The more important reason,
however, is that policy-makers specifically
What’s the Good of Education? The
Economics of Education in the UK edited by
Stephen Machin and Anna Vignoles is
published by Princeton University Press
(2005). Stephen Machin is Professor of
Economics at University College London,
research director of CEP and director of the
Centre for the Economics of Education, which
is funded by the Department for Education
and Skills. Anna Vignoles is Senior Lecturer
at the Institute of Education and a CEP
research associate.
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If we continue to let
people leave the
education system 
with very poor basic
skills, they will be
disadvantaged for life
designed the EMA intervention in such a
way as to make it amenable to rigorous
quantitative evaluation. For example, it
was not rolled out nationally and a serious
attempt was made to obtain proper
control groups.
This would seem to be the future of
effective policy-making in education.
Policies need to be drawn up in such a
way that robust quantitative evaluation is
possible, with much emphasis on the need
to construct a proper control and to
document fully the inputs and outputs
associated with the policy intervention.
In the right circumstances,
randomisation can be an attractive, and
conceptually appealing, possibility here
and one that the government should be
more open to pursue. But we would not
go as far as some, who argue that
random experiments need to be
conducted to test any new educational
policy. There are instances where random
experiments are neither feasible nor
ethical, and where non-experimental
analysis of observational data can be
extremely useful.
Nonetheless, if we wish to see a step
improvement in the quality of education
policy-making, much more attention must
be directed towards the design of such
policies and their potential to be
accurately and precisely evaluated. Those
working in the field of economics of
education have, of course, an important
role to play in this process. 
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S
ocial mobility – or
‘intergenerational mobility’
as economists prefer to
call it – measures the
degree to which people’s
social status changes
between generations. It is seen by many as
a measure of the equality of life
opportunities, reflecting the extent to
which parents influence the success of
their children in later life or, on the flipside,
the extent to which individuals can make it
by virtue of their own talents, motivation
and luck.
The rapid increase in UK income
inequality that began in 1979 is sometimes
justified by the argument that society is
now more meritocratic so that it is easier
for the poor to become richer if they are
willing and able to work hard. In fact, our
research shows that the opposite has
occurred – there has actually been a fall in
the degree of social mobility over recent
decades. Children born to poor families are
now less likely to break free of their
background and fulfil their potential than
they were in the past.
The fall in social mobility can be
illustrated by comparing two sons born in
1958 and who left school in the 1970s
(those individuals tracked in the National
Child Development Survey) where the
parents of one earned twice as much as
the parents of the other. The richer son
would earn on average 17.5% more in his
early thirties than his poorer friend. For
two comparable boys born in 1970 and
who left school in the 1980s (tracked in
the 1970 British Cohort Study), this
advantage increased to %.
The wider focus of our research is to
understand better whether the extent of
social mobility in Britain and its recent
decline are mirrored in other developed
countries. The results show that Britain has
mobility levels of the same order of
magnitude as in the United States, but well
below Canada, Germany and the Nordic
countries. What is more, the decline in
mobility in Britain between the 1970s and
1980s is not replicated in the United States
even though inequality was rising in both
countries. 
Education has been seen as a route to
greater intergenerational mobility. So it is
natural to ask what role education plays in
the recent decline in mobility and whether
it can help explain why mobility has fallen
in Britain but remained constant in the
other countries. Our research highlights
how the relationship between family
income and children’s higher education
attainment has grown stronger between
cohorts completing their education in the
1970s and the late 1990s. This implies that
the big expansion in university participation
has tended to benefit children from
affluent families more. 
We consider two stages of educational
performance: staying on at school after the
compulsory school leaving age of 16; and
higher education attainment. Since this
Social mobility
in Britain: low and falling
The government wants ‘to create a Britain 
that is economically successful because it 
is socially mobile’. But new research by 
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin
indicates that social mobility is not only
declining but also significantly lower than in
some other developed countries.
involves looking at education rather than
incomes when adults, we can add a third
cohort to those of 1958 and 1970:
children reaching the age of 16 in the
1990s. This gives a partial picture of how
mobility may be changing for a more
recent birth cohort.
Figure 1 shows how the proportion of
young people staying in education beyond
the age of 16 has evolved over time.
Educational inequality is measured as the
difference in the staying on rate of young
people with parental income in the richest
20% compared with young people with
parents in the poorest 20%.
The first thing to note is that the
staying on rate has increased from 1974
to the late 1990s for young people from
both income groups. The more interesting
result is that the speed of the increase has
varied substantially for young people in
different periods. It is clear that between
1974 and 1986, staying on rates for
children from the richest backgrounds
were rising faster, which led to an increase
in educational inequality.
But from 1986 to the late 1990s, the
staying on rate of those from the poorest
backgrounds rose more quickly, leading to
a reversal of educational inequality. Over
the 1990s, young people from poorer
backgrounds have clearly taken up the
opportunity to stay on in post-compulsory
education as never before. This is likely to
be in part a consequence of the
introduction of the General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSE). 
But do the trajectories that individuals
are on lead to higher qualifications? We
can explore this question by considering
the completion of higher education by
income group in a similar way. Figure 2
presents results similar to those from Figure
1 but this time with degree attainment by
age 23 as the outcome. Once again,
educational expansion is evident with
increases in attainment for students from
all backgrounds.
But in contrast with the staying on
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Figure 1:
Staying on rates by parental income group 
L
at
e 
19
90
s
(B
H
P
S
)
19
86
 
(B
C
S
)
19
74
(N
C
D
S
)
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
s 
of
 s
am
p
le
s 
w
h
o 
st
ay
ed
 o
n
 a
t 
sc
h
oo
l 
ag
e 
16
Figure 2:
Degree completion by age 23 by parental income group
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
s 
of
 s
am
p
le
s 
ob
ta
in
in
g 
a 
d
eg
re
e 
by
 a
ge
 2
3
L
at
e 
19
90
s
(B
H
P
S
)
19
93
 
(B
C
S
)
19
81
(N
C
D
S
)
The strong relationship between
family income and educational
attainment is at the heart of
Britain’s low mobility culture
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results, educational inequality has risen in
all periods. Young people from the poorest
income groups have increased their
graduation rate by just 3 percentage
points between 1981 and the late 1990s,
compared with a rise in graduation rates
of 26 percentage points for those with the
richest 20% of parents. 
The clear conclusion is that the
expansion in higher education in Britain
has benefited those from richer
backgrounds far more than poorer young
people. This occurred over a period when
means-tested student support declined
sharply. We have used this evidence as a
cautionary tale in the recent debate
around the introduction of top-up fees for
universities in England and Wales. In the
past, increasing the numbers of students
has failed to increase the participation of
the poorest groups. It is crucial that this
situation changes for further expansion of
higher education – and that means
commitments to provide more generous
grants and fair access.
So to what extent is the relationship
between education and income a causal
one? In other words, does ‘money matter’
or is it that richer families produce more
educated children because parental
education, motivation and other aspects
of family culture differ?
Separating the effect of income from
the impact of other aspects of the family is
a difficult identification problem. In our
research, we use a number of techniques
that net out permanent differences in
income, which will be related to factors
such as parents’ education, to focus on
transitory differences in income and their
impact on educational outcomes. This can
be done in a number of ways focusing on
differences across siblings or across time
for the same child.
Overall, the results provide consistent
evidence of a significant causal impact of
family income on educational attainment.
They suggest that a one-third reduction in
income from the average increases the
probability of a child getting no A-C
GCSEs by 3 to 4 percentage points and
reduces the chances of achieving a degree
by a similar magnitude. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to judge if the causal effect of
income on education has changed across
cohorts. But what is clear is that family
income differences between the rich and
the poor do have an important impact on
children’s educational outcomes.
At the same time, it must be clarified
that the impact of income on education is
small compared to the overall gap in
attainment between rich and poor
children. This implies that policies to raise
intergenerational mobility also need to
focus on raising children's attainment
through targeted services in addition to
considering income redistribution.
In this area, meeting a target of
equalising educational opportunities needs
to use more direct means such as early
years education, improved schools for
poor communities and steps to promote
participation in post-compulsory
education. Indeed, this is the policy
direction that the government seems to be
taking through Sure Start, Excellence in
Cities and the Educational Maintenance
Allowance (EMA). It is important, however,
that these policies have solid evaluation
strategies, such as has been pursued with
the EMA, so we can improve our
knowledge of what really works.
The evidence suggests that
intergenerational links in Britain are
particularly strong, which means that the
current extent of policy development may
be insufficient for the task at hand. We
need to adopt a strategy to equalise
opportunities coupled with careful policy
evaluation to help us understand how
policies can begin to narrow
intergenerational inequalities.
Children born to poor
families are now less likely 
to break free of their
background than they 
were in the past
The expansion in higher
education has benefited
those from richer
backgrounds far more
than poorer young people
Jo Blanden is a research officer in CEP’s
programme on education and skills. Stephen
Machin is Professor of Economics at
University College London and CEP’s
research director. Paul Gregg is Professor of
Economics at the University of Bristol and a
senior research fellow in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
More details on the research discussed here
are in ‘Intergenerational Mobility in Europe
and North America’ by Jo Blanden, Paul
Gregg and Stephen Machin
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/about/news/
IntergenerationalMobility.pdf), a report
supported by the Sutton Trust; and in
‘Educational Inequality and Intergenerational
Mobility’ by the same authors, a chapter in
What’s the Good of Education? The
Economics of Education in the UK (Princeton
University Press, 2005).
Further reading
Jo Blanden and Paul Gregg (2004), ‘Family
Income and Educational Attainment: A
Review of Approaches and Evidence for
Britain’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Jo Blanden (2005), ‘Essays on
Intergenerational Mobility and its Variation
over Time, Place and Family Structure’ 
(PhD thesis, University of London).
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This article is an extract from ‘What’s Wrong
with Europe’s Economy?’ by Adair Turner,
chapter 1 of Challenges for Europe edited by
Hugh Stephenson (Palgrave, 2004), a
collection of the eight public lectures
delivered at LSE to celebrate CEP’s award of
the Queen’s Anniversary Prize in 2002.
Adair Turner is vice chairman of Merrill
Lynch Europe, chair of the UK Pensions
Commission and chair of CEP’s Policy
Committee. Hugh Stephenson recently
retired as CEP’s head of public affairs.
What’s wrong with 
Europe’s economy?
There is a conventional wisdom that Europe’s poor
economic performance is a sign of deep structural
problems, which must be addressed by product market
liberalisation, labour market reform and reduction of
uncompetitive tax burdens. But writing in a new CEP
book, Adair Turner argues against that conventional
wisdom. In his view:
 The Eurozone’s poor growth is caused by macro-
policy problems and rules, which must be changed.
 Taxation burdens are not in some general and
structural sense unsustainable.
 Looking at longer-term differences between
European and US prosperity and productivity, we
need to recognise the impact of physical
environment and social choice. Within this context,
while the EU’s product market liberalisation agenda
is positive, it is unlikely to have more than a
marginal impact.
 But some EU labour markets are seriously inefficient
and should be reformed.
Provided such a policy mix is pursued, there is no reason
why Europe should not continue to grow GDP per capita
at an attractive rate, delivering increasing prosperity and
employment in an already rich continent. Absolute GDP
per capita will almost certainly remain permanently below
the United States, because of the social choices that
Europeans make, but it will grow as far as fast.
The issue that then arises is whether these choices – to
sacrifice some productivity potential in order to protect the
environment and to take some of the benefits of
productivity growth in increased leisure – are
unsustainable? Some people believe they are, assuming
that Europe cannot choose to trade off income for leisure
or income for protected environment because such choices
make Europe ‘uncompetitive’ in the global economy. But
these arguments are in general quite wrong.
National economies do not compete with one another in
the normal sense of the word and societies have wide
degrees of freedom to make their own trade-offs. If
Europeans choose both to produce less and to consume
less, that has no consequences for competitive
sustainability. Provided Europeans understand the
consequences of their trade-offs – for instance, that
shorter hours worked mean lower GDP per capita – there
is nothing unsustainable about that choice.
But choices could become unsustainable if based on
inconsistent assumptions: for instance, on decisions to do
less work without accepting the consequences of lower
income. And there is certainly one European social choice
that is unsustainable: the current combination of birth
rates, retirement ages and explicit or implicit pension
promises. The argument that deep structural reform is
required to the European model is often overstated, but
not in relation to retirement ages and pension provision.
The argument that Europe
needs deep structural reform
is often overstated – but not
in relation to pensions
Europeans can choose 
both to produce less and 
to consume less 
without becoming
‘uncompetitive’
in brief...
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Pay inequalities and 
economic performance
What is the relationship between the
structure of earnings within firms and their business and
employment performance? A major CEP project led by
David Marsden has been using new European data to
examine the role that firms' performance management
systems play in the macroeconomy. In particular, the
project has explored the ways in which these systems
interact with institutional features of the labour market to
produce different outcomes in different regional and
industrial contexts.
The research finds that greater pay inequalities within
firms seem to be related to better business performance.
But the relationship appears to weaken as inequality levels
increase, and their incentive effect appears to depend on
the type of work organisation and human resource
management approach adopted by the firm. The effect of
greater pay inequalities on performance may be related to
the slow diffusion of newer, more team-based, methods
of work organisation within the EU.
The greater pay inequalities in some countries – Ireland,
Spain and the UK compared with Belgium, Denmark and
Italy – do not systematically give rise to higher
employment rates in these countries. In 1995, Denmark
and the UK had the highest ratios of employment to
population, and Spain and Italy the lowest ones.
The greater inequality in the first three countries appears
to be linked to a greater degree of labour market
segregation of low paid groups and by gender. This
segregation goes beyond the familiar industry
concentration and emerges as a phenomenon associated
with employment in certain kinds of firms. Hence, more
attention should be given to their human resource policies
with regard to low pay and gender. Youth employment
appears segmented along similar lines.
National and sectoral pay agreements do not uniformly
restrict employers' pay policies across countries more than
single employer agreements. Whereas single employer
bargaining has been associated with greater earnings
variation compared with national bargaining in the UK,
the opposite appears to hold for Belgium and Italy. There,
enterprise bargaining is associated with less inequality
than national or sectoral bargaining. The reason for the
smaller variation in Belgium and Italy seems to lie in the
greater degree to which single employer bargaining is
coordinated across firms.
Finally, pay inequalities at firm level have to be considered
in conjunction with other human resource management
and work organisation policies. The beneficial effect of
greater pay variability on performance depends on there
being an appropriate work environment for such
incentives.
The project has been conducted by a multidisciplinary team
of researchers with support from the European
Commission and in close collaboration with Eurostat and
the national statistical institutes. At the core of its empirical
research programme is the 1995 European Structure of
Earnings Survey, which provides rich data on key micro-
level variables on a comparable basis across Europe.
This article summarises ‘Pay Inequalities and
Economic Performance’ by David Marsden
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/piep/papers/
Final_Report_V5.pdf), the final report of a
project funded under the EU’s fifth
framework programme. The CEP team also
included Tanvi Desai, data manager, and
Richard Belfield, researcher.
David Marsden is Professor of Industrial
Relations at LSE and an associate in CEP’s
labour markets programme.
The beneficial effect of
greater pay variability on
performance depends 
on an appropriate work
environment
Greater pay inequalities within
firms seem to be related to
better business performance
in brief...
I
n 2002, average unemployment in
Europe was relatively high
compared with OECD countries
outside Europe. Yet the majority of
countries in Europe in 2002 had
lower unemployment than any OECD
country outside Europe, including the
United States. These two facts are
consistent because the four largest countries
in continental Western Europe – namely,
France, Germany, Italy and Spain – have very
high unemployment and most of the rest
have comparatively low unemployment.
This variability is highly informative
because despite ‘free’ movement of labour,
European countries have more or less
independent labour markets in practice.
Using this information, we see how changes
in the structure of the various labour
markets explain a substantial proportion of
the secular fluctuations in unemployment in
the various countries.
In particular, we can pin down some of
the particular factors that enable us to
understand why some European countries
have been able fully to recover from the
unemployment disasters of the early 1980s
whereas some have not.
Changing labour market
institutions
Table 1 presents a picture of
unemployment in the OECD since the
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Tackling 
unemployment:
Europe’s successes and failures
Why has unemployment fallen in some
European countries but not in others? 
To answer this question, Richard Layard,
Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman revisit
their landmark analysis of macroeconomic
performance and the labour market.
1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-99 2000-1 2002
Australia 2.5 1.9 4.6 7.7 8.7 7.9 6.5 6.3
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.7 4.3
Belgium 2.3 2.3 5.8 11.2 8.4 9.2 6.8 7.3
Canada 5.5 4.7 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.0 7.7
Denmark 2.2 1.7 4.1 7.0 8.1 5.3 4.4 4.5
Finland 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.4 9.1
France 1.5 2.3 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.5 9.0 8.7
Germany (W) 0.8 0.8 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.4 6.4 6.8
Ireland 5.1 5.3 7.3 13.8 14.7 8.7 4.0 4.4
Italy 3.5 4.2 4.5 6.7 8.1 9.9 8.4 7.4
Japan 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.9 5.4
Netherlands 0.9 1.7 4.7 10.0 7.2 4.5 2.6 2.8
Norway 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.9
New Zealand 0.0 0.3 0.7 4.7 8.1 6.8 5.7 5.2
Portugal 2.3 2.5 5.5 7.8 5.4 6.0 4.1 5.1
Spain 2.4 2.7 4.9 17.6 19.6 19.4 13.5 11.4
Sweden 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.6 5.5 4.9
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.5 2.6 2.6
UK 2.6 3.1 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.8 5.2 5.1
United States 5.5 4.3 6.4 7.6 6.1 4.8 4.4 5.8
Table 1
Unemployment (standardised percentage rate) 
1960s. Our analysis suggests that a large
part of the dramatic rise in unemployment
in the big continental European countries
over this period can be explained by
changes in the key labour market
institutions – changes in unemployment
benefit systems, increases in labour taxes,
increased power of trade unions and
changes in employment protection law.
It is widely accepted that labour
market rigidities are an important part of
the explanation for the high levels of
unemployment that are still to be found in
a number of OECD countries. But
acceptance is not universal. One often
cited argument is that labour market
rigidities cannot explain why European
unemployment is so much higher than US
unemployment because the institutions
generating these rigidities were much the
same in the 1960s as they are today and
in the 1960s, unemployment was much
higher in the United States than in Europe.
What are the facts? It is indeed correct
that US unemployment was much higher
than European unemployment in the
1960s, but as we have seen, the picture
today is less clear-cut than is commonly
thought. And what of the argument that
the European institutions generating
labour market rigidities have been more or
less unchanged since the 1960s? In fact,
the evidence makes clear that this is
simply not true.
Unemployment benefits
There are four aspects of the
unemployment benefit system for which
there are good theoretical and empirical
reasons to believe that they will influence
the long-run, equilibrium, level of
unemployment: the level of benefits; the
duration of entitlement; the coverage of
the system; and the strictness with which
the system is operated.
Of these, data are only available for
the first two for the OECD countries. The
OECD has collected systematic data on the
unemployment benefit replacement ratio
for three different family types – single,
with dependent spouse and with spouse
at work – in three different duration
categories from 1961 to 1999.
The key feature of these data is that in
nearly all countries, benefit replacement
ratios tended to become more generous
from the 1960s to the late 1970s, the
exceptions being Germany, Japan and
New Zealand. Italy had no effective benefit
system over this period for the vast
majority of the unemployed.
After the late 1970s, countries moved
in different directions. Italy introduced a
benefit system and those in Finland,
Portugal and Switzerland became
markedly more generous. By contrast,
benefit replacement ratios in Belgium,
Ireland and the UK have fallen steadily
since the late 1970s or early 1980s.
It is unfortunate that we have no
comprehensive data on the coverage of
the system or on the strictness with which
it is administered. This is particularly true
in the case of the latter because the
evidence we possess appears to indicate
that this is of crucial importance in
determining the extent to which a
generous level of benefit will actually
influence unemployment.
For example, Denmark, which has very
generous unemployment benefits, totally
reformed the operation of its benefit
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1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-98 Extension laws 
in place
Australia 48 45 49 49 43 35 
Austria 59 57 52 51 45 39 
Belgium 40 42 52 52 52 - 
Canada 27 29 35 37 36 36 ✕
Denmark 60 61 71 79 76 76 ✕
Finland 35 47 66 69 76 80 
France 20 21 21 16 10 10 
Germany (W) 34 32 35 34 31 27 
Ireland 47 51 56 56 51 43 ✕
Italy 32 48 45 40 37 
Japan 33 33 30 27 24 22 ✕
Netherlands 41 38 37 30 24 24 
Norway 52 51 52 55 56 55 ✕
New Zealand 36 35 38 37 35 21 ✕
Portugal 61 61 61 57 34 
Spain 9 9 9 11 16 18 
Sweden 64 66 76 83 84 87 ✕
Switzerland 35 32 32 29 23 
UK 44 47 55 53 42 35 X
United States 27 26 20 16 14 X
Table 2
Union density (union members as a percentage of employees)
The Big Four countries
of continental Europe
have very high
unemployment;
most of the 
rest have
comparatively low
unemployment
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system through the 1990s with a view to
tightening the criteria for benefit receipt
and the enforcement of these criteria via a
comprehensive system of sanctions. The
Danish Ministry of Labour is convinced that
this process has played a major role in
allowing Danish unemployment to fall
dramatically since the early 1990s without
generating inflationary pressure. 
A further aspect of the structure of the
benefit system for which we do not have
detailed data back to the 1960s are those
policies grouped under the heading of
active labour market policies (ALMPs), the
purpose of which is to provide active
assistance to the unemployed that will
improve their chances of obtaining work.
We do, however, have data from 1985,
which shows that, by and large, the
countries of Northern Europe and
Scandinavia devote most resources to
ALMPs. It might be hypothesised that they
do this because high expenditure on ALMPs
is required to offset their rather generous
unemployment benefit systems and to push
unemployed individuals into work. Such
additional pressure on the unemployed is
less important if benefits are very low
relative to potential earnings in work.
Systems of wage
determination
In most countries in the OECD, the
majority of workers have their wages set
by collective bargaining between
employers and trade unions at the plant,
firm, industry or aggregate level. The
available data on collective bargaining
coverage – the proportion of employees
covered by collective agreements – show
that across most of continental Europe,
including Scandinavia but excluding
Switzerland, coverage is both high and
stable. This is either because most people
belong to trade unions or because union
agreements are extended by law to cover
non-members in the same sector.
In Switzerland and the OECD countries
outside continental Europe and Scandinavia,
coverage is generally much lower, with the
exception of Australia. In New Zealand, the
UK and the United States, coverage has
declined with the fall in union density, there
being no extension laws.
Table 2 shows the percentage of
employees who are union members.
Across most of Scandinavia, membership
tends to be high. By contrast, in much of
continental Europe and in Australia, union
density tends to be less than 50% and is
gradually declining. In these countries,
there is, consequently, a wide and
widening gap between density and
coverage, which it is the job of the
extension laws to fill. This situation is at its
most stark in France, which has the lowest
union density in the OECD at around
10%, but one of the highest levels of
coverage at around 95%.
Outside these regions, both density
and coverage tend to be relatively low and
both are declining at greater or lesser
rates. The absence of complete coverage
data means that we have to use density
measures to capture the impact of
unionisation on unemployment. As should
be clear, this is only half the story, so we
must treat any results we find in this area
with some caution. 
The other aspect of wage bargaining
that appears to have a significant impact
on wages and unemployment is the
extent to which bargaining is co-
ordinated. Co-ordination refers to
mechanisms whereby the aggregate
employment implications of wage
determination are taken into account
when wage bargains are struck.
This may be achieved if wage
bargaining is highly centralised, as in
Austria, or if there are institutions, such as
employers’ federations, which can assist
bargainers to act in concert even when
bargaining itself ostensibly occurs at the
level of the firm or industry, as in
Germany or Japan. It is worth noting that
co-ordination is not, therefore, the same
as centralisation, which refers simply to
the level at which bargaining takes place:
plant, firm, industry or economy-wide.
Notable changes in co-ordination
since the 1960s are the increases in
Ireland and the Netherlands towards the
end of the period and the declines in
Australia, New Zealand and Sweden. Co-
ordination also declined in the UK over
the same period but this simply reflects
the sharp decline of unionism overall.
Employment protection
Employment protection laws may tend to
make firms more cautious about filling
vacancies, which slows the speed at
which the unemployed move into work.
But the mechanism here is not clear-cut.
For example, the introduction of
employment protection laws often leads
to an increased professionalisation of the
personnel function within firms, as was
the case in the UK in the 1970s. This can
increase the efficiency of job matching.
So in terms of outflows from
unemployment, the impact of
employment protection laws can go either
way. By contrast, such laws will clearly
reduce involuntary separations and hence
lower inflows into unemployment. So the
overall impact on unemployment is an
empirical question. Furthermore,
employment law may also have a direct
impact on pay since it raises the job
security of existing employees,
encouraging them to demand higher 
pay increases.
Labour taxes
The important taxes here are those that
form part of the wedge between the real
product wage (labour costs per employee
normalised on the output price) and the
real consumption wage (after tax pay
normalised on the consumer price index).
These are payroll taxes, income taxes and
consumption taxes. Their combined
impact on unemployment remains a
subject of some debate despite the large
number of empirical investigations. 
All countries exhibit a substantial
increase in the total tax rate on labour
over the period from the 1960s to the
1990s although there are wide variations
across countries. These mainly reflect the
extent to which health, higher education
and pensions are publicly provided along
with the all-round generosity of the social
security system. Some countries have
made significant attempts to reduce
labour taxes in recent years, notably the
Netherlands and the UK.
Labour market institutions
and the successes and
failures of the 1990s
Having looked at some of the key factors
that the evidence suggests have some
impact on equilibrium unemployment, let
us see how changes in these variables over
the last two decades can contribute to our
understanding of unemployment changes
over the same period.
Table 3 provides a picture of changes
in the relevant variables with a tick
referring to a significant move that will
tend to reduce unemployment and a cross
for the reverse. Double ticks and crosses
reflect really big moves. A dash implies no
significant change. Of course, this is a
pretty crude business and a proper panel
data analysis is arguably preferable. But
here we are able to take account of
variables where we are unable to obtain
long time series data.
So we can ask the question: do the
ticks and crosses bear any relationship to
the unemployment changes reported in
the final columns of the table? Our
analysis indicates that the number of 
ticks and crosses explains about half the
cross-country variation in unemployment
changes from the early 1980s to the
present. We may reasonably 
conclude that the countries that had 
very high unemployment in the early
1980s and still have high unemployment
today simply have too few ticks and/or 
too many crosses.
Four strategies for tackling
unemployment
The experience of the last 15 years shows
that given sensible macroeconomic
policies, it is possible to ensure that
unemployment remains fairly close to the
full employment level. Four strategies seem
particularly relevant.
 To prevent people drifting into long-term
unemployment, there should be active
policies to ensure that everyone gets
offers of work or training within a year
of becoming unemployed. The work
should where possible be with regular
employers, and secured if necessary by a
recruitment subsidy. A modernised
Public Employment Service is a key
instrument in the business of
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Replacement Benefit Benefit ALMP Union Union Co-ordination
rate duration strictness coverage density
Europe
Austria ✕ - - - -  ✕
Belgium  - - - - - ✕
Denmark - ✕   - - ✕
Finland ✕ - - - - ✕ 
France - ✕ -  ✕ - ✕
Germany (W) - ✕ -  - - -
Ireland  ✕ - - ?  
Italy ✕ - - - - - 
Netherlands - -   - - 
Norway ✕ ✕   - - ✕
Portugal ✕ ✕ -  -  -
Spain  - - - ✕ - -
Sweden ✕ - - - - - ✕
Switzerland ✕✕ ✕ -  - - ✕
UK  ✕  ✕   -
Non-Europe
Australia - -   -  ✕
Canada  ✕ - - - - -
Japan ✕ - - - - - -
New Zealand - - - ✕   ✕✕
United States - -  - - - -
Table 3
‘Policy’ changes from the early 1980s to the late 1990s
Active labour market
policies are needed to
prevent people drifting into
long-term unemployment 
channelling job offers to workers. It
should be properly staffed and funded,
with private agencies free to compete
with it.
 The welfare-to-work approach will not
prevent long-term unemployment if
individuals who receive offers from
employers can instead choose to
continue living on benefit. A system of
complementary rights and responsibilities
is needed where the citizen can expect
high-quality help in finding work, but in
return must take advantage of it or cease
to draw benefits. Provided the state is
channelling offers of work or work-
related activity to everyone within the
first year of unemployment, that should
be the maximum period for which
benefits are paid to people who are not
working or engaged in some work-
related activity.
 Further policies are needed to deal with
regional unemployment. In particular,
the decentralisation of wage setting and
measures aimed at improving the
external environment where firms
operate (for example, the efficiency of
public administration, the enforcement
of the rule of law, etc.) are also
essential. The decentralisation of
collective bargaining can be
accompanied with measures
encouraging regional labour mobility
and encouraging take-up of relatively
low-paid jobs, for example, by providing
in-work benefits to low-wage earners.
 Labour supply reducing policies such as
early retirement, as well as uncontrolled
access to invalidity pensions, should be
phased out as the welfare-to-work
approach makes it possible to deal with
redundancies without having to
implement (high cost) early retirement
for older workers. Reforms of pension
systems should also remove from public
pension arrangements those features
that discourage the participation of
older workers.
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Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance
and the Labour Market by Richard Layard,
Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman is
published by Oxford University Press
(second edition, 2005; first edition, 1991).
Richard Layard is Emeritus Professor of
Economics at LSE, a member of the House
of Lords and founder director of CEP.
Stephen Nickell is School Professor of
Economics at LSE, a member of the Bank of
England’s Monetary Policy Committee and a
research associate in CEP’s programme on
labour markets. Richard Jackman is
Professor of Economics at LSE and a
research associate in CEP’s programme on
labour markets.
Employment Labour Total Unemployment Unemployment
protection taxes  ✕ 1980-87 2000-1 change
Europe
Austria - ✕ 1 3 3.1 3.7 0.6
Belgium  - 2 1 11.2 6.8 -4.4
Denmark  - 4 2 7.0 4.4 -2.6
Finland  - 2 2 5.1 9.4 4.3
France ✕ - 1 4 8.9 9.0 0.1
Germany (W)  - 2 1 6.1 6.4 0.3
Ireland -  4 1 13.8 4.0 -9.8
Italy  ✕ 2 2 6.7 8.4 1.7
Netherlands   5 0 10.0 2.6 -7.4
Norway  - 3 3 2.4 3.6 1.2
Portugal  - 4 2 7.8 4.1 -3.7
Spain  - 2 1 17.6 13.5 -4.1
Sweden  - 1 2 2.3 5.5 3.2
Switzerland - - 1 4 1.8 2.6 0.8
UK -  6 2 10.5 5.2 -5.3
Non-Europe
Australia - ? 3 1 7.7 6.5 -1.2
Canada - X 1 2 9.7 7.0 -2.7
Japan - - 0 1 2.5 4.9 2.4
New Zealand - ? 3 3 4.7 5.7 1.0
United States - - 1 0 7.6 4.4 -3.2
Table 3
– cont’d
There should be a
maximum period for
which benefits are
paid to people who
are not working
The passage of the 1999 Employment
Relations Act arguably signified the recovery of trade
unions’ political influence after many years of exclusion
from policy-making under the Conservatives. As a new
CEP book edited by John Kelly and Paul Willman
shows, the Act has been very important in stimulating
increased union organising and a pragmatic
accommodation to union recognition by many employers.
But it has also become clear that there are severe limits to
the influence that unions can exert over the Labour
government. The DTI review of the union recognition
provisions was regarded by the TUC as a valuable
opportunity to engage the government in dialogue over
improvements to the operation of the recognition law. But
the government largely ignored many of the
representations and proposed few statutory amendments. 
In areas beyond employment legislation, unions have also
found it difficult to influence the government. Many
public sector unions have opposed the private finance
initiative but have failed to persuade the government to
abandon, slow down or even review its planned role. In
some cases, unions have been handicapped by
competition among themselves. In others, ministers have
exploited deep policy divisions between unions to secure a
coalition of support behind contentious measures while
isolating their most vocal opponents.
If the modest impact of unions on
government has not been helped by
problems on the union side, it is only
fair to note the structural difficulties
they face. Many unions remain
affiliated to Labour despite growing
disquiet over government policy. Even
if the new generation of union leaders
were to succeed in launching a more
coordinated campaign inside the party, the changes in
party structure, rules and funding over the past ten years
have seriously eroded the potential for union influence. 
Looking forward, a number of events might disturb
current trends. The radicalisation of union leaderships is
one. While this emerges from democratic choices made by
existing union members, its role in assisting the
broadening of the membership base remains to be seen.
Leadership change has been particularly evident in public
sector and industrial unions and may exert its greatest
effect in these remaining bastions of union strength.
A second event with very different possible implications is
the European directive on information and consultation.
This has two likely consequences. First, the sector with no
union voice is likely to shrink substantially under the
impact of this statutory requirement: only the smallest
firms will escape.
Second, since the directive requires representative
structures, it will affect workplaces where direct
communication is the dominant voice mechanism. It is
difficult not to see in this measure a major opportunity for
unions to assist employer compliance in ways that might
increase membership and perhaps bargaining coverage.
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New opportunities for 
Britain’s trade unions?
Union Organisation and Activity edited by
John Kelly and Paul Willman (Routledge,
2004) is published in CEP’s series on the
future of trade unions in Britain.
John Kelly is at Birkbeck, University of
London. Paul Willman is at Oxford
University.
There are severe limits to the
influence that unions can exert
over the Labour government
The Employment Relations Act 
has been very important in stimulating
increased union organising
in brief...
Happiness:
Lessons from a New Science
by Richard Layard
Allen Lane
256pp £16.99 h/b
ISBN: 0-713-99769-9
In this landmark book, Richard Layard
shows that there is a paradox at the heart
of our lives. Most people want more
income. Yet as societies become richer,
they do not become happier. This is not
just anecdotally true, it is the story told by
countless pieces of scientific research. We
now have sophisticated ways of measuring
how happy people are, and all the
evidence shows that on average people
have grown no happier in the last 50
years, even as average incomes have more
than doubled. In fact, the First World has
more depression, more alcoholism and
more crime than 50 years ago. This
paradox is true of Britain, the United
States, continental Europe and Japan.
What is going on?
Contents: 
Part One: The Problem. 1. What's the
problem? 2. What is happiness? 3. Are we
getting happier? 4. If you're so rich, why
aren't you happy? 5. So what does make
us happy? 6. What's going wrong? 7. Can
we pursue a common good? 
Part Two: What Can Be Done? 8. The
Greatest Happiness: Is that the goal? 
9. Does economics have a clue? 10. How
can we tame the rat race? 11. Can we
afford to be secure? 12. Can mind control
mood? 13. Do drugs help? 14 Conclusions
for today's world
Labour Supply and 
Incentives to Work in Europe
edited by Ramón Gómez-Salvador,
Ana Lamo, Barbara Petrongolo,
Melanie Ward and Etienne Wasmer
Edward Elgar
424pp £75.00 h/b
ISBN: 1-845-42129-9
Labour Supply and Incentives to Work 
in Europe highlights recent developments
in the labour supply in Europe and gives a
detailed assessment of their link with
economic policies and labour market
institutions. Despite major changes in
European labour supply during the past
few decades, the existing literature still
lacks a comprehensive study of the
relationship between labour supply and
labour market institutions from a macro
perspective. 
The contributors, themselves from a
variety of academic disciplines and
backgrounds, consider aspects of labour
supply such as incentives to work,
determinants of labour force participation
and new forms of employment
relationships. Each original and specially
written chapter has its own discussion
chapter to follow it. The book ends with a
valuable panel discussion on the topic of
labour supply in an enlarged Europe.
This book will be read with interest by
scholars of economics and labour
economics in particular, as well as those
researching industrial relations.
Contents: 
Introduction  Part I: Incentives to Work 
1. A Matching Model of Non-Employment
and Wage Pressure  2. Tax-effects on Work
Activity, Industry Mix and Shadow
Economy Size: Evidence from Rich Country
Comparisons Part II: Factors Affecting
Labour Force Participation  3. Mother’s
Changing Labour Supply in Britain, the
USA and Sweden  4. Women’s Hours of
Market Work in Germany – The Role of
Parental Leave  5. The Determinants of
Labour Force Participation in the European
Union  6. Hiring Incentives and Labour
Force Participation in Italy Part III: New
Forms of Employment Relationships  
7. Recent Developments in Part-time Work
in EU Countries: Trends and Policy 
8. Matching Workers to Jobs on the Fast
Lane: The Operation of Fixed-Term
Contracts 
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